Privacy & no-KYC

Is full-disk encryption useful on a VPS?

Short answer

Against physical seizure of a powered-off disk, decisively yes: the volume is ciphertext without your passphrase. Against an attacker with access to the running hypervisor, no — the key is in memory the host can read. Any provider claiming otherwise is overselling, and the distinction is the whole point.

The right implementation keeps the passphrase off the machine. Our Bastion line ships LUKS2 with an initramfs SSH daemon: on every boot you connect and supply the passphrase, and we never hold it. That means a reboot needs you, which is the correct trade for this threat model.

What it genuinely protects against: decommissioned disks, hardware seizure, a datacentre incident, and a support engineer with physical access. What it does not protect against: a compromised hypervisor, or a compromise of the running instance itself.

See also: Hypervisor · LUKS